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Scorsese’s Silence: Film as Practical Theodicy
Abstract
Martin Scorsese’s adaptation of Shusaku Endo’s novel Silence takes up the anguished experience of God’s
silence in the face of human suffering. The main character, the Jesuit priest Sabastião Rodrigues, finds his faith
gutted by the appalling silence of God as he witnesses the horrific persecution of Christians in seventeenth
century Japan. Yujin Nagasawa calls the particularly intense combination of the problems of divine hiddenness
and evil the problem of divine absence that resists resolution through explanations that have typically
characterized the theodicies offered by philosophers. Drawing on the thought of Ignatius of Loyola, this essay
explores the way Scorsese’s Silence raises the problem of divine absence for Rodrigues and, through his
experience, suggests a way of living with it. This mode of response, I contend, makes what Nagasawa calls
cosmic optimism—a hopeful attitude that all is good on a cosmic scale—accessible to devout believers like
Rodrigues by grounding it in identification with the god-forsakenness experienced by Christ upon the cross in
an experience akin to catharsis that delivers a clarifying emotional consonance. Viewed through an Ignatian
lens, the film does more than illustrate a way of responding, it actively engages the imagination in a way that
enables viewers to encounter the problem of divine absence and gain the intimate knowledge needed to live
with it themselves. In this sense, I argue, Silence can itself be a practical theodicy.
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Martin Scorsese’s adaptation of Shusaku Endo’s novel Silence takes up the 
anguished experience of God’s silence in the face of human suffering. Set in 17th 
century Japan, Silence vividly depicts the brutal persecution of the Kakure 
Kirishitians (or hidden Christians) and the Portuguese Jesuits who try to support 
them. Some 40,000 were tortured and martyred during this period. 1 The main 
character, the Jesuit priest Sabastião Rodrigues, finds his faith gutted by the 
appalling silence of God, exclaiming “The weight of Your silence is terrible” 
(1:05).2 His problem is not fundamentally intellectual. He does not really want or 
need a theodicy that explains why God’s silence is compatible with God’s love of 
these persecuted Christians. His problem is existential in the sense that he is directly 
experiencing this silence as a crushing weight. Rodrigues’s words indicate that his 
problem is not precisely the one philosophers have generally set themselves to 
addressing, namely, whether God’s apparent hiddenness is conceptually compatible 
with God’s existence. Yujin Nagasawa calls the particularly intense combination 
of the problems of divine hiddenness and evil that Rodrigues and these hidden 
Christians experience the problem of divine absence: an experience of God’s 
hiddenness that gives devout believers who are enduring great suffering reason to 
think that their lives are void of meaning.3  
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Philosophers widely acknowledge that the searing personal experience of 
evil and hiddenness is untouched by even the most sophisticated conceptual 
explanations of evil and hiddenness.4 Accordingly, Nagasawa argues that there can 
be no solution to the problem of divine absence, only a response that points toward 
a way of living with it. Drawing on Endo’s novel and other writings, he suggests 
devout believers might adopt an attitude of cosmic optimism—a hope that all will 
be good on a cosmic scale despite their inability to see it—and regard their 
experience of divine absence not as the end of faith but as its true beginning. While 
Nagasawa is surely right to seek a practical as opposed to an intellectual response 
to this existential problem, the cosmic optimism he recommends may well not be 
accessible to those suffering so intensely. Not only is the attitude itself based upon 
a kind of conceptual solution, namely, that human beings are incapable of seeing 
how all could be well on a cosmic scale due to their cognitive limitations; it also 
requires some deeper experience to ground it.5 To hold out hope in the midst of the 
darkness of divine absence, one must be intimately acquainted with the love and 
goodness of God. 
In my view, the narrative itself—both in the film and the novel—serves as 
the grounding experience that makes the attitude of cosmic optimism available to 
those experiencing divine absence. Jesuit founder, Ignatius of Loyola, placed 
imaginative contemplation at the heart of spiritual practice, believing that careful 
visualization—what he calls the composition of place (compositio loci) and the 
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application of the senses—creates a space for revelation and consolation.6 Clearly 
schooled in this practice, Rodrigues often merges his experience with Christ’s 
passion, reading his journey as so many stops along the via dolorosa. When his 
experience of silence is at its most intense, Rodrigues finds Christ’s “Why hast thou 
forsaken me?” echoing in his mind, and senses the true, human terror Jesus felt 
before God’s silence.7 Viewers are invited, in Ignatian fashion, to stand with 
Rodrigues even as he stands with Jesus with this bewildering question on their lips, 
hoping for some consolation even when there is no demystifying word to be heard.  
This essay explores the way Scorsese’s Silence raises the problem of divine 
absence for Rodrigues and through his experience suggests a way of living with it, 
thereby offering a practical response, if not a solution, to the problem. This mode 
of response makes the cosmic optimism Nagasawa calls for accessible by 
grounding it in personal identification with the god-forsakenness felt by Christ 
upon the cross in an experience akin to catharsis that delivers a clarifying emotional 
consonance. Not only does the film offer a narrative that illustrates a way of 
responding to divine absence, it also creates a place where viewers themselves can 
encounter the problem of divine absence and find the intimate knowledge needed 
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II. Divine Absence in Scorsese’s Silence 
 
To understand Nagasawa’s problem and how it is raised in Scorsese’s film, it will 
be helpful to situate this problem within the larger philosophical discussion of evil 
and hiddenness. Traditionally, the problem of evil and hiddenness have been 
construed as arguments against the existence of God. The argument from evil 
contends that one can infer from the amount and variety of suffering we see in the 
world that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly loving God is 
unlikely. Similarly, the argument from hiddenness contends that one can infer from 
God’s hiddenness from people “who are capable of relating personally to God but 
who, through no fault of their own, fail to believe”—so called nonresistant 
nonbelievers—that the existence of a perfectly loving God who desires such 
personal relationships is unlikely.8 These arguments are raised by the general facts 
about suffering and hiddenness and are intellectual in nature; they focus on the 
rationality of belief in God given these facts. Responses to these problems—
theodicies or defenses—aim to show that belief in God is rational, because God’s 
existence is compatible with these facts about evil or hiddenness. As Peter van 
Inwagen points out, this task is fundamentally apologetic, not pastoral, and aims to 
address the intellectual problem, not the existential one raised by the pressing pain 
felt by those experiencing suffering or hiddenness at close range.9 The existential 
problem is not experienced as rational doubt but as personal crisis. Philosophers 
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working on the problems of suffering and hiddenness, accordingly, have long 
recognized their discourse is signally unsuited to address this existential problem.10 
Their explanations, according to Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser, seem 
“lame, if not contrived,” when offered as comfort to devout believers in the throes 
of existential crisis.11 For such people the problem is not theoretical, some 
intellectual puzzle to be solved, but experiential, like a searing shock of electricity 
that concentrates every shred of attention on the immediate pain. Those 
experiencing the existential problem require something more and other than the 
explanations traditional theodicies and defenses offer; they require a practical 
theodicy that shows them the way to live with their experience. As I have already 
noted, Nagasawa’s problem of divine absence is existential and therefore calls for 
such a practical response.  With this context in place, we can turn to the details of 
Nagasawa’s problem and the way it is raised in Scorsese’s Silence. In the next 
section, we will consider Nagasawa’s response. 
According to Nagasawa, the problem of divine absence is the coincidence 
of the horrendous suffering of devout believers and God’s hiddenness from them 
in that experience.12  Unlike the traditional problem of hiddenness that focuses on 
nonresistant nonbelievers, the problem of divine absence focuses on the experience 
devout believers have of God’s hiddenness when they are experiencing horrendous 
evil. ‘Horrendous evil’ is Marilyn Adams’s term for evil “the participation in which 
(that is, the doing or suffering of which) constitutes prima facie reason to doubt 
5
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whether the participant’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to 
him/her on the whole.”13 Adams offers such gruesome examples as “the rape of a 
woman and axing off of her arms, psycho-physical torture whose ultimate goal is 
the disintegration of personality, betrayal of one’s deepest loyalties… parental 
incest, slow death by starvation. . . the explosion of nuclear bombs over populated 
areas.”14  In Scorsese’s film, we see people beheaded, scalded to death, crucified, 
drowned, burnt alive, and hung upside down in pits of offal, all while their friends 
and families look on. For such people, these are horrendous evils. When those 
suffering these sorts of meaning destroying evils are devout believers, they 
experience the problem of divine absence. For such believers, the God whom they 
have trusted is not just hidden but absent. Suffering and seeing no sign of God poses 
a threat to the positive value of their lives, because what they most long for is God’s 
redemptive presence. In Nagasawa’s view, divine absence is particularly 
challenging to theists, since it calls into question the existence of the loving God 
that grounds their sense of identity and gives their lives meaning. Nagasawa argues 
that the suffering of the Kakure Kirishitans in 17th century Japan that Endo’s novel 
Silence so vividly presents is an especially extreme example of this problem. As I 
will show, Scorsese’s film raises and elucidates the problem Nagasawa has 
identified in a distinctive and visceral way that enables viewers to access the 
excruciating process of estrangement and disorientation that the experience of 
divine absence entails. 
6




 From the very beginning of Scorsese’s Silence, suffering and God’s silence 
confront the viewer. The film’s plot turns on Sabastião Rodrigues and his 
companion Francisco Garupe’s mission to find out what has happened to their 
superior, Father Christovao Ferreira. One of the last Catholic priests in Japan, 
Ferreira has fallen silent as the severity of the persecution of Christians has swept 
across the country. Their quest is personal. As Rodrigues puts it, Ferreira “nurtured 
us in the faith … [and] shaped the world for us.” Scorsese’s film opens at the boiling 
springs of Unzen in the mountains outside of Nagasaki. The first thing we see are 
the severed heads of Christians on pikes slowly emerging from the steam. The 
ambient sounds of cicadas, hissing steam and chatter of the Japanese guards fade 
to the background as we hear a letter from Ferreira, delivered in his own voice, 
describe in excruciating detail the torture of priests he has witnessed, their slow 
death brought on by ladling the scalding spring water over their bodies. As he 
speaks, the scene at Unzen unfolds before our eyes. The voiceover continues in a 
steady reflective tone altogether incongruous with the shaken expression we 
observe on Ferreira’s face as he is forced by his captors to look upon this torture. 
Ferreira’s letter expresses deep admiration for these martyrs who would not 
renounce their faith, concluding: “The story of their courage has become almost 
legend. They give hope to those of us who remain here, against the shogun’s order, 
to teach the faith. We only grow stronger, in His love.”15 The film, then, cuts to 
Macao some seven years later, where Rodrigues and his fellow Jesuit, Garupe, are 
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informed that Ferreira has apostatized and now lives as a Japanese in the service of 
his former persecutor, the shogun Inoue. They are staggered by the news, profess 
disbelief, and vow to recover Ferreira even at the cost of their own lives. If he has 
truly renounced faith, they ask, “what would it mean for our faith?” This question 
encapsulates what becomes Rodrigues’s central struggle, namely, how to maintain 
faith when God seems to have abandoned the most deeply devoted believers to the 
most horrific suffering. The doubt this divine absence stirs undermines the hopeful, 
triumphant narrative Ferreira’s letter tells and the one Rodrigues desperately wants 
to believe. 
A few scenes help show how the problem of divine absence develops in 
Scorsese’s film and the specific texture it has for Rodrigues. When he and Garupe 
first arrive in Japan, they are sheltered by the Kakure Kirishitans in the small village 
of Tomogi just outside Nagasaki. Hiding these priests puts these villagers at 
significant risk. At one point, government officials, led by the shogun and chief 
inquisitor Inoue, come to the village. Having been informed of the presence of 
Christians, they demand the Christians to identify themselves. They also offer 
substantial rewards to anyone who identifies a Christian.  Finally, four men 
tremblingly step forward to protect the other Christians and the priests. They know 
they face torture, even execution, if they do not publicly renounce their faith by 
spitting or trampling upon an image of their beloved savior or the virgin Mary 
called a fumie. As their inquisition continues, Rodrigues, deeply moved by this 
8




demonstration of love for him, for the villagers and for God, reflects in voiceover: 
These people are the most devoted of God’s creatures on earth … I 
confess, I began to wonder. God sends us trials to test us, and 
everything He does is good. . . . But why must their trial be so 
terrible? And why, when I look in my own heart, do the answers I 
give them seem so weak? (51:00). 
 
Rodrigues recognizes in this moment that the answers generally given for 
suffering—theodicies—can give no substantial relief. In the end, three of the 
Christians cannot convincingly renounce their faith and are bound to crosses, 
submerged in the sea, and slowly drowned to death in the ebb and flow of the tide 
as the villagers look silently on.  As Rodrigues observes this gruesome scene, we 
enter his mind, hearing in his voice the text of a letter addressing his superior in 
Macao, 
You will say that their death was not meaningless. Surely God heard 
their prayers as they died. But did He hear their screams? How can 
I explain His silence to these people who have endured so much? I 
need all my strength to understand it myself. (1:01) 
 
Rodrigues cannot conceive how their suffering and death could be rendered 
meaningful and cannot ignore God’s apparent insensitivity to their ‘screams.’ In 
Nagasawa’s terms, Rodrigues sees their suffering is horrendous and God’s silence 
to their screaming prayer in their hour of need only exacerbates the problem by 
rendering it appallingly inexplicable.  
After these executions, Rodrigues and Garupe part ways and the film 
follows Rodrigues in his quest to find Ferreira. In his flight, which he self-
9
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consciously reads as his own via crucis, the experience of these crucifixions looms, 
gripping him more deeply with every step. At one point, Rodrigues, huddled against 
a rock, prays, cradling a tiny crucifix carved by one of the crucified Christians in 
his hands. In whispered voiceover, Rodrigues prays: 
I feel so tempted. I feel so tempted to despair. I’m afraid. The weight 
of your silence is terrible. I pray, but I am lost. Or, am I just praying 
to nothing. Nothing, because you are not there (1:05-1:06). 
 
These lines take a full minute to be delivered in a whispered voiceover that puts 
viewers in Rodrigues’s mind. Scorsese uses a time-lapse effect to communicate the 
passage of time and the disorienting intensity of this moment. As he prays the last 
words, he looks up as if realizing for the first time the possibility that the God to 
whom he prays may not exist. In the script, Rodrigues says, “Despair is the greatest 
sin, but the mystery of your silence, it crowds my heart.”16 Dispensing with this 
commentary, Scorsese allows the words “you are not there,” hollowly hanging in 
the emptiness, to communicate the existential crisis that threatens Rodrigues’s 
belief in the God to whom he paradoxically cries. This crisis is only heightened as 
the film proceeds to its climactic scene in which Rodrigues is forced to apostatize 
to save five Christians from torture. In the moment before his apostasy, when he is 
challenged to believe Christ is absent, he desperately protests, “No. No. . . . Christ 
is here. I just can’t hear him” (2:16). This moment, perhaps more than any other, 
captures the anguish of divine silence—the felt helplessness and abandonment in 
10




the face of horrendous suffering—that is the essence of Nagasawa’s problem of 
divine absence.  
As these scenes make clear, Rodrigues’s struggle with divine absence is not 
merely intellectual; it is existential, a crisis of faith. He does not want to hear an 
explanation—he already feels the feebleness of the available explanations—he 
wants to hear a voice of consolation; he wants to know personally that he is not 
alone. As Nagasawa puts it, he is not yearning for a third-person account of how 
God’s love might be consistent with God’s hiddenness from devout believers. His 
demand, like the Psalmist’s “Why standest thou afar off, O Lord? Why hidest thou 
thyself in times of trouble?” (Ps 10:1), is a second-person demand for God’s 
personal presence. 
 
III. Nagasawa’s response: Cosmic Optimism 
 
In Nagasawa’s view, there really can be no solution to the existential problem of 
divine absence.17 The available explanations, as Rodrigues himself suggests, are 
“weak;” they cannot really explain why God does not respond to the “screams” of 
devoted believers. The suffering of divine absence cannot be simply balanced-off 
with some greater good in the future; it is an indelible, ineliminable feature 
permanently fracturing these lives.18 In the end, all that can be hoped for is a way 
for devout believers to live with these fractured moments. In this spirit, Nagasawa 
11
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offers a way of responding to divine absence—not a solution—that he thinks is 
available for such believers. His response is based upon some of Endo’s other 
writings and Silence, but, significantly, does not emphasize a key aspect of the way 
that Rodrigues learns to live with the problem. In part, this is because Nagasawa 
seems to reject as viable the kind of experience Rodrigues has, namely, that God in 
the person of Jesus speaks to him at the very moment he apostatizes. This is evident 
in the way Nagasawa poses the question to which his response is an answer:   
How can we solve or address the experiential problem of divine 
absence if the only way to solve it fully satisfactorily is that God 
breaks His silence and eliminates the pain and suffering of the 
victims of horrendous evil or at least explains why He cannot help 
them? In this case, no successful solution to the problem is available 
to us, because God does remain silent.19 
 
It may be that Nagasawa takes the voice Rodrigues hears as not breaking silence, 
since it offers neither explanation nor relief, only accompaniment. He might also 
reject this possibility, because such breaking of silence is not something one can 
simply make happen. In any case, Nagasawa is not only saying that philosophical 
explanations fail to resolve the existential problem in view, but that the most 
obvious experiential solution, God’s breaking silence, is also off the table.20 That 
leaves believers to find some other means for enduring the absence of God.  
Nagasawa argues that the experience of divine absence itself can be a 
germinal moment of faith or the beginning of true religion. He cites the following 
passages from Endo’s autobiographical work Watashi Ni Totte Kami Towa (What 
12




is God for Me) as inspiration for this claim: 
“Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? that is to say, My God, my God, why 
hast thou forsaken me?” Without this, true religion does not even 
start. Imagine, for example, that a child is dying from leukemia. Her 
parents pray hard. Yet, the child dies. . . . So there is no God, and 
there is no Buddha. That’s the essence of ‘Eli, Eli, lama 
sabachthani?’ But that is precisely where true religion starts. People 
start thinking seriously about what religion really is when they face 
the very situation which compels them to think that there is no God 
and no Buddha.21  
 
Later in that same work, Endo writes: 
But if faith does not go through such [cry of derelictions type 
questions] it is not true faith. It’s not true religion. Conversely, 
believers who avoid these questions are not true believers. No matter 
how far we go it is unlikely that we can resolve all the problems. Yet 
our effort to always keep in mind these problems and tackle them 
represents true faith and true religion; an attempt to solve all of them 
easily and quickly does not.22  
 
The lesson Nagasawa draws from Endo is that the experience of god-forsakenness 
at the heart of Jesus’s cry of dereliction is the moment true religion begins and that 
such genuine religion not only begins with this experience, it holds onto it, resisting 
easy solutions, in the recognition that there just are not any available to such 
cognitively limited beings as humans are.  Nagasawa calls the attitude Endo 
describes ‘cosmic optimism’ and characterizes it this way: 
Cosmic optimism is not epistemic confidence but an attitude that 
believers can choose to hold with respect to the place of humans in 
the universe. This is an attitude of hope that the gap in our cognitive 
and epistemic capacity corresponds to the puzzlement raised by 
divine absence. Cosmic optimists regard their encounters with 
divine absence not as an end of their faith but as an opportunity to 
embrace cognitive and epistemic humility.23 
13
deweese-boyd: Scorsese’s Silence: Film as Practical Theodicy
Published by DigitalCommons@UNO, 2017
  
 
The way he sees it, the problem of divine absence may well lead one to view the 
world as religiously negative, that is, “more compatible with the non-existence of 
God rather than with the existence of God,” but for devout believers it is possible 
to hold onto the hope that “all is good on a cosmic scale.”24 He emphasizes that this 
response is not one that he is presenting to nonbelievers or even those with a weak 
faith commitment, but to devout believers experiencing this problem. He writes, 
“we seek instead a response to the problem which suggests how devout believers 
can accept the problem yet try to live with it without giving up their faith.”25 He 
concludes by pointing to the way Rodrigues maintains faith after his apostasy and 
throughout the years he lives as a Japanese in service to Inoue’s government. 
“Rodrigues’s new faith,” he writes, “takes divine absence seriously but does not 
undermine itself as it retains a small portion of optimism.”26 So, for Nagasawa, 
devout believers can live with divine absence—the horrendous evil and divine 
hiddenness—by accepting its reality and holding out the hope that all is well from 
a cosmic point of view, i.e., having an attitude of cosmic optimism. Crucially, this 
attitude is compatible with substantial existential doubt.  
While this attitude of cosmic optimism may describe a way of maintaining 
faith and living with divine absence, it does not explain how the devout believers 
make their way to this attitude, or how precisely the experience of divine absence 
could possibly prompt such an attitude. It is difficult to imagine Rodrigues telling 
himself, after he has apostatized, that he should maintain some hope, be optimistic: 
14




Who knows all may be good on a cosmic scale? It is harder still to imagine that 
such a thought could be any real response to the existential anguish he is 
experiencing in that moment. It seems unlikely from a psychological point of view 
that he or anyone experiencing divine absence could simply decide to adopt this 
attitude of optimism. This attitude of hope itself needs some grounding in 
experience; it cannot rest on the intellectual recognition that human beings are too 
cognitively limited to solve the puzzle of divine absence. The problem is that 
Nagasawa takes the experience of divine absence itself to be the beginning of 
cosmic optimism without adequately explaining how. What practices enable devout 
believers to cultivate cosmic optimism?  Endo’s testimony is suggestive, since he 
says that the cry of dereliction is the start of true religion. While Nagasawa sees the 
importance of this cry as entering into and holding onto the fact of divine absence, 
he does not spell out how this cry itself is related to the attitude of cosmic optimism. 
Perhaps it is the active participation with Christ in this lament of divine absence, 
not simply the passive suffering of it, that grounds cosmic optimism in experience. 
So, the question is how devout believers can participate in that cry in a way that 
generates the faith and hope characteristic of this attitude. If we understand a 
practical theodicy as a way of responding to the existential problem, then the 
question is what practices engender cosmic optimism. This is a question to which, 
I think, Scorsese’s Silence, viewed through an Ignatian lens, offers an answer. 
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IV. Silence as Spiritual Exercise 
 
Reading Scorsese’s film through the lens of Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual 
Exercises helps shed light on the way Rodrigues ultimately deals with the problem 
of divine absence and suggests a way the film itself might offer viewers, regardless 
of their religious commitments, the possibility of vicariously encountering the 
problem of divine absence in a productive way. 
  Since the founding of the Society of Jesus or Jesuit order in 1540, Ignatius’s 
Spiritual Exercises have played a central role in the training and spiritual practice 
of the members of this order.  In the film, as in the novel, Rodrigues and Garupe 
are both Jesuits and as such would have worked their way through the intense thirty-
day series of meditations that comprise the Spiritual Exercises during their novitiate 
and again just before taking their vows during their ‘tertianship.’ The practices of 
this manual would have shaped their whole attitude toward the world as well as 
their understanding of their mission. Scorsese’s script indicates a deep awareness 
of this fact, quoting directly from the Exercises at several key points. Moreover, the 
film itself bears the marks of a person familiar with the way this spiritual practice 
works, not just in the way the scenes are set up and shot, but also in the way the 
audience is drawn into Rodrigues’s thoughts and prayers.27  
 The Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola are essentially a series of 
guided meditations aimed at helping people discover how they can best serve God 
16




and reflect the image of Christ. What is most distinctive about the Exercises is their 
use of the imagination in the process of seeking divine guidance. Exercitants are 
asked to imagine particular ideas or scenes from the life of Jesus, in the latter case 
carefully applying their senses, considering how the scene looks, what it smells 
like, what people are saying and the like. The expectation is that in this imaginative 
space exercitants will find some revelation about their path in life and their relation 
to God. Each meditation concludes with a colloquy in which the exercitant speaks 
to God or before God as a friend about whatever the meditation has brought to the 
surface. As Roland Barthes suggests, there is multiplicity at the heart of the 
Exercises; it is a text that generates texts. The spiritual director offers a text to the 
exercitant in the form of a presentation of the exercise to be performed, then the 
exercitant writes another text, “an acted text made up of the meditation, gestures, 
and practices given him by his director.” This acted and embodied text, then, is 
directed toward God in the prayers, colloquia, and meditations in the hope that God 
will respond, speaking in some way through the images to reveal some spiritual 
truth. The text understood in this sense is dramatic, active and dialogic. Throughout 
the Exercises, which are divided into four weeks, the aim is to elect a path that best 
fulfills the purpose of praising and serving God in the process of saving one’s soul.28 
While the first week is purgative, focusing on the way one’s wrongdoing has 
alienated one from God, the rest of the weeks largely focus on contemplating 
moments in the life, passion and resurrection of Jesus with a view to attaining love. 
17
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Ultimately, the exercitant seeks, through identification with Christ, to imitate Christ 
in whatever vocation he or she should choose.  
 Rodrigues’s entire outlook on the world might be understood as an 
outgrowth of the practices of the Exercises. His constant lapsing into colloquy, 
identification of his experiences with moments in the life of Christ, his passion in 
particular, are the most obvious connections. An excellent example of the way the 
exercises shape Rodrigues’s experience and outlook comes when he is fleeing 
Tomogi, after the Kakure Kirishitans have been crucified. In their fraught 
conversation before they leave, Garupe suggests these Christians have died for 
them, that they are responsible for their deaths, something Rodrigues vehemently 
rejects. But, aboard the tiny boat that moves quietly over the night dark sea, as 
Rodrigues trails his hand in the water, sucking the salty drops from his fingers, he 
prays, “I imagine your son nailed to the cross, and my mouth tastes like vinegar” 
(1:02-1:03). This image is precisely the one used in the colloquy that concludes the 
first exercise. And, just as that exercise prompts the exercitant to consider their 
wrongdoing and alienation from God, Rodrigues struggles with his own mission, 
reflecting, “I am just a foreigner who brought disaster. That’s what they think of 
me now . . .” He is at sea, over dark waters, in the mists, as Scorsese presents the 
scene.  Shame, sorrow and bewilderment envelope Rodrigues as he walks through 
a devastated and abandoned village he had only recently found so joyfully receiving 
the gospel and the sacraments. He leans, exhausted, against a building and prays. 
18




We see him from the back and hear him in voiceover ask exactly the questions one 
is to consider in the colloquy at the end of the first exercise: “What have I done for 
Christ? What am I doing for Christ? What will I do for Christ?” (1:04)29 This scene 
may be read as an enactment of this part of the exercises in which one imagines 
oneself “as bound, helpless, [and] alienated.”30 Rodrigues, feeling the horror of 
being the harbinger of disaster, prays, “The weight of your silence is terrible. I pray, 
but I am lost. Or, am I just praying to nothing. Nothing, because you are not there” 
(1:05-1:06). As in the exercises, this alienation prompts a desire to accompany 
Jesus and feel the true depths of divine love. This is a moment of purgation in the 
exercises. In the film, the scene acts as a bridge to the path that more and more 
resembles Christ’s passion in Rodrigues’s eyes, a path that notably leads through 
the experience of divine absence.  
 Focusing on the way Rodrigues reads his life as an imitation of Christ 
suggests a response to Nagasawa’s problem of divine absence that might make the 
cosmic optimism he recommends available for devout believers. When exercitants 
consider the passion, they are to “ask for grief with Christ in grief, anguish with 
Christ in anguish, tears and interior pain at such great pain which Christ suffered 
for [them].” 31 They are to consider the sufferings of Christ at the time of the 
Passion, not simply as a bystanders, but as Christ himself felt them. As one 
commentary on this meditation suggests, they are to “pay special attention to how 
the divinity hides itself so that Jesus seems so utterly human and helpless [and] 
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should make every effort to get inside the Passion, not just staying with external 
sufferings, but entering the loneliness, the interior pain of rejection and feeling 
hated, the anguish within Jesus.”32 This exercise prompts reflection on what Christ’s 
kenosis and sacrifice entailed, and in particular, what it felt like for Jesus to 
experience the hiddenness of God at the moment of his greatest suffering. As 
Gerard Hughes, S.J., reminds exercitants, “Whenever and whatever we read of 
Christ in the Gospels, we are also reading our own self-portrait, for Christ is what 
we are called to be.”33 
In the film, we watch Rodrigues enacts this exercise, explicitly coming to 
read his own self-portrait as Christ. Early in the film, just before he sets out from 
Macao, Rodrigues recalls an image of Christ’s face he had first encountered as a 
novice, reflecting  
He looks as he must have when He commanded Peter, ‘Feed my 
lambs, feed my lambs, feed my sheep.’ . . . It's a face filled with 
vigor and strength. It fascinates me. I feel such great love for it.  
(12:46) 
 
As we hear these words, Scorsese cuts to the image itself, one chosen to 
communicate the deep compassion that must have been in Christ’s eyes as he 
caringly restores Peter after his denial.34 Scorsese’s inspired choice to use a painting 
by El Greco in which Christ, crowned with thorns, looks out from the cross with 
openly loving eyes captures Rodrigues’s own shifting picture of Christ. Early in 
Endo’s book, the image of Christ’s face that rises in his mind is Piero della 
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Francesca’s painting of the resurrection.35 There, Christ stands strong and 
triumphant with one foot on the sepulcher, the Roman guards struck unconscious 
in the foreground. As Rodrigues more closely identifies with Christ’s passion, he 
sees the humiliated, compassionate face of Christ suffering on the cross. This shift 
has implications for what imitating Christ means for Rodrigues. Whereas he 
formerly hoped for a glorious martyrdom, perhaps seeing himself eventually 
standing in triumph upon his own grave, he now sees the crown of thorns. Just 
before Rodrigues is betrayed into the hands of the Shogun’s guards, Rodrigues, 
delirious from thirst, drinks from a stream and sees his own reflected face literally 
become this image of Christ for an instant (1:11-1:12). Scorsese uses this moment 
to communicate Rodrigues’s entry into what he (and we viewers with him) will 
experience as a version of the passion. This identification with Christ is essential 
for understanding how Rodrigues deals with the problem of divine absence, since 
it is in his solidarity with Christ’s suffering that he finds himself able to bear God’s 
silence. The Exercises have primed Rodrigues to find God in all things, even the 
horror he encounters after his arrest.  Attending to the stations on Rodrigues’s way 
of the cross and their connection to Ignatius’s Exercises both in content and practice 
shows how Scorsese’s Silence indicates a way to achieve the cosmic optimism in 
the face of divine absence that Nagasawa recommends. 
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V. Rodrigues’s Passion: Spiritual Practice as Practical Theodicy 
 
In what follows, I walk through these stations along Rodrigues’s way in order to 
demonstrate that his practice of engaging his suffering, specifically his experience 
of divine absence, as an extended meditation on Christ’s passion is what enables 
him to find his way to cosmic optimism. This practice, I will argue, constitutes a 
practical theodicy. 
After his arrest, Rodrigues undergoes severe psychological torture. He is forced 
at one point to witness his beloved fellow priest Garupe—who would not apostatize 
to save several Christians from being drowned at sea—himself drown in an effort 
to keep them from going under. He has seen another Christian he was imprisoned 
with decapitated, because he refused to apostatize. Scorsese at this point shows 
Rodrigues agonizing over Christ’s cry of dereliction. In the scene, Rodrigues is 
huddled in his cell at night, while a festival remembering the dead goes on in the 
background. Scorsese uses a montage sequence that cuts to Garupe’s corpse 
floating in the sea and to the beheaded man being dragged across the courtyard, as 
Rodrigues utters in a loud weeping whisper: 
My God, my god, why have you forsaken me? Why have you 
forsaken me?  It’s your son. Your son’s words on the cross. . . . You 
were silent.  Even to Him.  Silent.  Cold.  Silent. . . . No. no. 
Ludicrous. Ludicrous. Stupid. Stupid. (1:55) 
 
In this moment, Rodrigues realizes that Jesus experienced God’s silence, God’s 
absence, and momentarily enters the words he utters, joining in the first-person 
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pronoun Jesus and every other person who used those words to express their 
lamentation at God’s absence. The thought is ludicrous to him: how could God be 
hidden from the incarnate? This scene suggests a way for Rodrigues to deal with 
the silence, but it is one that, at first, he finds most difficult to enter, though he is 
gaining what Ignatius calls interior knowledge of Christ’s suffering.  In terms of 
the Exercises, he is being invited to stand with Jesus in the moment of god-
forsakenness in order to truly understand Christ’s love. As he later reads his 
situation, he is identifying with Christ in Gethsemane, praying that this cup of 
suffering be taken from him (Matthew 26.39). 
Not until the night of his final ordeal does Rodrigues seem to submit fully 
to the humiliation of Christ’s own passion. Just before the meditations on the 
passion, the Exercises invite the exercitant to beg Jesus to be chosen for the most 
perfect humility, namely, to “want and choose poverty with Christ poor rather than 
wealth; contempt with Christ laden with it rather than honors. Even further … to be 
regarded as a useless fool for Christ, who before me was regarded as such, rather 
than as a wise or prudent person in this world.”36 The point is “to evoke a desire to 
be as like to Christ as possible in an attitude of loving humility, no matter what the 
cost.”37 While Rodrigues had always desired to imitate Christ, he had formerly seen 
only the glory and triumph of this imitation, not the suffering and humiliation. At 
this point, as he approaches his final trial, the true cost of the latter comes sharply 
into focus.  
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As Scorsese sets the climactic scene, Rodrigues, in a state of anguish, is 
forced to choose to renounce his faith to save five Kakure Kirishitans who are 
hanging upside down in pits of offal and filth before his eyes. They had already 
apostatized many times, but their torture continues. Having heard their groans all 
night, Rodrigues is in agony. Ferreira is there, prodding him to apostatize, telling 
him: 
A priest should act in imitation of Christ. If Christ were here. . . . If 
Christ were here He would have acted. Apostatized. For their sake. 
Christ would certainly have done at least that to help men. (2:15)38 
 
Ferreira’s lines highlight the fact that for Rodrigues the imitation of Christ involves 
something more difficult than the sacrifice of his body in a martyr’s death, namely, 
the sacrifice of his religious identity. Christ’s own death, motivated by his 
compassion for those rejected, alienated and humiliated, rendered him ritually 
accursed, an exile and infidel according to his religion. It is this imitation of Christ’s 
love that Ferreira urges. In the end, Rodrigues can bear their suffering no longer. 
As he stands before the fumie, looking upon the face of Christ worn smooth by all 
who had forsaken their faith, he hears: 
Come ahead now. It’s all right. Step on Me. I understand your pain. 
I was born into this world to share men’s pain. I carried this cross 
for your pain. Step. Your life is with Me now. Show Me your love. 
(2:17) 
 
In response to the voice, he steps. In the script, Scorsese writes, “His foot touches 
the fumie. . . . the beautiful face he loved . . . the face he loved most in the world.”39 
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The moment is shot in slow motion, close up on his foot, Rodrigues stepping and 
crumpling to the ground, humiliated by the act of love. There is no sound and the 
viewer feels the devastation as Rodrigues rejects what he had understood to be the 
meaning of his life, paradoxically entering through this rejection into Christ’s 
mercy more deeply than ever before. Years later, after having lived as a Japanese 
serving his inquisitor Inoue, an exile from his native land and church, Rodrigues’s 
betrayer approaches him and asks for absolution, an act whereby a priest releases a 
person from their sin in the sacrament of penance. After he protests that he cannot 
perform the sacrament of penance, having apostatized, we hear him pray, “Lord, I 
fought against Your silence” and hear Jesus answer, “I suffered beside you. I was 
never silent” (2:27). He then whispers the following: 
I know. . . . But even if God had been silent, my life . . . to this very 
day . . . everything I do . . . everything I’ve done . . . speaks of Him. 
It was in the silence that I heard Your voice. 
 
The play between the second and third person suggest the paradox at the center of 
the incarnation. God remains third-person and distant, while this whispered prayer 
addresses Jesus in the intimate second-person. Rodrigues hears Jesus’s voice and 
enters into his passion and exile, and like Jesus his life becomes an image of God’s 
love, and yet there remains a sense in which God is still silent. This is the humility 
of standing with Christ. The script provocatively quotes from the prologue to the 
Gospel of John when Rodrigues is first arrested: “And the word was with God, and 
the word was God” (John 1:1). The prologue goes on to say: “And the word was 
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made flesh and dwelt among us” (John 1:14). Like Christ, Rodrigues’s life has 
spoken God’s word insofar as he has abandoned everything for the sake of love, 
God’s true essence. This is how silence speaks.40  
Nagasawa rejects the possibility that God would break silence as a viable 
solution to the existential problem of divine absence, because he takes God’s 
breaking silence to involve explaining why divine help is impossible or to involve 
the direct relief of suffering. But, Silence suggests an alternative path, one of 
accompaniment in suffering. The inbreaking voice does not come from on high, but 
from beside as a cry of lamentation. Rodrigues’s story suggests that in the 
experience of divine absence, in the cry of dereliction itself, devout believers may 
experience solidarity with Jesus, hearing in their own cries the very human voice 
of Jesus. In the film, this experience of solidarity is signaled by the voice of Jesus, 
allowing God both to speak and remain silent, to be present in absence. In 
Rodrigues’s case, stepping into the self-emptying love by stepping onto the beloved 
emblem of his faith marks the moment that the Pauline phrase, “I—but not I—
Christ”, applies (Galatians 2:20). Rodrigues’s self, abandoned and negated out of 
love for the suffering, is now one with Christ’s self. This is not a solution; it is a 
response. In the act of lamentation and sacrificial love, Rodrigues finds Jesus 
present in divine absence.  
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VI. Conclusion: Film as Practical Theodicy 
 
 
Rodrigues’s close identification with Christ, in particular with his suffering and 
experience of divine absence, provides the experiential grounding necessary for the 
doubt-infused hope of cosmic optimism to emerge. Unlike Nagasawa’s version of 
cosmic optimism, however, it is not based in a recognition of human cognitive 
limitations so much as personal identification with the human Christ who suffers 
with human beings. Rodrigues’s example also suggests a path or set of practices 
that might enable devout believers to make their way to this experience. His ability 
to use the techniques of Ignatian meditation to imaginatively identify with Christ 
ultimately enable him to gain interior knowledge of Christ’s presence in his 
experience of divine absence, most notably, in his act of lamentation, the cry of 
dereliction. Rodrigues, then, offers a practical response to the problem of divine 
absence, a practical theodicy. I contend, however, that this response is not merely 
displayed as an illustration for viewers of the film, a kind of how-to guide for 
dealing with the problem of divine absence; Scorsese’s film itself can be a practical 
theodicy.  
Scorsese’s Silence engages the imagination in the sort of ways Ignatius of 
Loyal describes, drawing viewers into Rodrigues’s experience of divine absence 
and his response both. As Sergei Eisenstein, whose film theory draws significantly 
from Ignatius’s Exercises contends: 
27
deweese-boyd: Scorsese’s Silence: Film as Practical Theodicy
Published by DigitalCommons@UNO, 2017
  
 
A work of art, understood dynamically, is also a process of forming 
images in the mind of the spectator. Herein lies the peculiar quality 
of every genuinely vital work of art, which distinguishes it from a 
lifeless piece of work in which the spectator is presented with a 
depiction of the results of a certain past creative process instead of 
being drawn into a permanently occurring process.41 
 
We can see Silence, then, as a practical theodicy in the sense that it draws viewers 
into the process Rodrigues himself is drawn into. Paul Fraser, in his discussion of 
the sacramental aspect of film, connects this mystical experience of union with The 
Spiritual Exercises:  
Ignatius was content with art of our pure imagination through the 
means of contemplation of religious experience and Christian 
doctrine. Cinema projects the contemplation forward to the screen 
and then draws the individual to it.42  
 
Like a sacrament, cinema can render the imperceptible perceptible. Cinema, 
understood as a process mediated through the composition of place and the 
application of the senses—practices upon which the Exercises turn—allows 
viewers vicariously to experience the problem of divine absence and invites them 
to create their own text, as Barthes suggest, mimetically reflecting the experience 
of Rodrigues. As a consequence, viewers potentially enter into the knowledge 
Rodrigues himself enters into, namely, the intimate knowledge that personification 
of love effects between him and Christ. Even a viewer, then, who has no antecedent 
opinion about the existence of God, may experience the doubt and despair endured 
by the characters by means of the simulation the cinematic situation generates. Even 
if such viewers do not experience the shattering of meaning and identity that the 
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believers depicted do, they feel what this experience is like for those believers.  As 
Aristotle recognized, mimetic works of art engage emotions and with them beliefs, 
offering some sort of revelation in return. The central emotion at play in the film is 
love and its counterpart mercy. Viewers not only feel mercy for Rodrigues: they 
feel the mercy he feels for the victims being tortured, and are drawn with him into 
the response that alters and paradoxically affirms his faith. Silence, by engaging 
experience in this way, does not allow viewers to stand aloof, encountering only a 
cognitive version of this problem to puzzle through. Instead, it arouses some 
version of the existential problem itself and offers a taste of the strange consolation 
that Rodrigues seems to attain. In this way, Silence can itself be a practical theodicy, 
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